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Abstract: In Interactive Justice, Emanuela Ceva argues that the parties to 
an intractable value conflict should each be given an equal substantive right 
to a hearing. I suggest that Ceva’s account gives insufficient attention to the 
question of who counts as a party to a value conflict. Once more attention to 
this question is given, her defence of an equal right to a hearing may be put 
into question. 
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I. Introduction 
Emanuela Ceva’s book, Interactive Justice, is a refreshing contribution to 
contemporary political theory, exploring an important but neglected area in theorizing 
about justice: what she calls “interactive justice” (Ceva 2016).1 This term refers to 
justice as a property of people’s interactions when they face intractable and persistent 
value conflicts. Ceva convincingly argues that, when people come into conflict over 
matters of public concern—as people undeniably do in contemporary democratic 
societies—the demands of justice are twofold. One set of demands concerns the 
outcomes of those interactions, which should themselves be just. Another set of 
demands, which is understudied in the existing literature, concerns the procedures 
through which the relevant conflicts are managed (81). These should also be just, 
treating parties to the conflict in a way that appropriately reflects their status as 
dignity-bearers, capable of making claims (17).  
Outcome and procedural considerations are two independent dimensions of 
justice, which need not always align with one another. Achieving a just outcome may 
at times require sacrificing the justice of conflict-management procedures; 
conversely, ensuring that conflicts are managed justly may eventually lead to 
somewhat unjust outcomes. For Ceva, there is no a priori answer to the question of 
how such tensions should be resolved. What matters is that both dimensions of justice 
be kept firmly in view (19).
2
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 Numbers in parentheses in the main text refer to page numbers in this book. 
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 This is somewhat reminiscent of the “balancing” approach adopted in Brettschneider (2005), in 
connection with judicial review specifically.  
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The first of Ceva’s contributions, then, consists in placing emphasis on the 
concept of interactive justice. But the second, and equally important contribution, 
consists in her advancing a particular conception of interactive justice, articulating 
what it takes for people to be treated with dignity when intractable value conflicts 
occur. Here, Ceva invokes what I would call an equal substantive right to a hearing.
3
 
The idea is that, during value conflicts, all parties involved ought to (i) be given the 
same chance to speak and (ii) be equally listened to (133). Only then will the 
procedure for managing the conflict be properly respectful of each participant’s 
fundamental standing. To see this, consider a simple example: a departmental meeting 
in which several decisions have to be made, yet colleagues fiercely clash over the 
values that should guide those decisions. Imagine that, during the deliberation phase, 
only male colleagues are given a right to speak. This would of course be an unjust 
procedure, irrespective of its outcome. But there would be something almost as 
problematic if female colleagues were allowed to speak, and yet nobody listened to 
them. In both cases, we would be faced with what Ceva calls interactive injustice. 
The notion of an equal substantive right to a hearing may seem excessively 
vague and abstract. But as Ceva points out, this is a virtue, not a vice of her account. 
Different contexts may, in fact, call for different instantiations of her general 
principle. A one-size-fits-all set of recommendations for how to achieve interactive 
justice is simply unavailable. What to do should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis, under the guidance of her equal substantive right to a hearing principle (102-3). 
I agree with Ceva that interactive justice is an important and neglected 
dimension of justice theorizing. By identifying its conceptual contours and providing 
a sustained discussion of it, her book does a real service to justice theorists. In what 
follows, I wish to put some pressure on a couple of aspects of Ceva’s favoured 
conception of interactive justice. That conception strikes me as incomplete in one 
important respect. In particular, it lacks an account of who exactly count as parties to 
an intractable value conflict whose voices should be heard. And once we try to fill 
this lacuna, it becomes no longer obvious that interactive justice always requires an 
equal right to a hearing.  
 
II. Who are the parties to a conflict? 
To motivate my discussion, let me offer a stylized scenario. The scenario is far 
simpler than the complex cases of value conflicts Ceva discusses in her book, but it 
still exhibits the defining features of such conflicts. (I should mention that the 
example is made up and deliberately exaggerated.)  
 
Team-teaching: At an international university, a new, two-semester module is 
introduced, focusing on contemporary political theory. The first semester is to 
be devoted to general theories and concepts (part A); the second semester to 
particular applications of those theories to real-world problems (part B). Each 
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 This is my gloss on Ceva’s own label—in particular, Ceva refers to an equal right to a hearing. The 
addition of “substantive” is meant to capture the idea that speakers should also be actively listened to. 
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part of the course is team-taught by three academics. Team A meets just before 
the start of the academic year to decide how to design their portion of the 
course. Unfortunately, the three academics involved have very different visions. 
Professor Smith is convinced that analytic philosophy and conceptual analysis 
are all there is to political theory, and would like the first semester to be entirely 
devoted to them, with particular emphasis on the concepts of freedom and 
equality. Professor Beauchamp disagrees. He finds analytic philosophy 
problematically a-critical and status-quo-biased. He insists that the first 
semester should be devoted to post-structuralist and post-colonial work. Finally, 
Professor Schultz is a nihilist about political theory in general, and is convinced 
that the first semester should be devoted to German literature instead.  
 
This simple scenario presents an intractable value conflict over a matter of “public 
concern,” where the relevant public is not a polity at large, but the academics in 
charge of the course. Moreover, the scenario includes two parties to the conflict 
whose views are arguably reasonable (Smith and Beauchamp), and one whose views 
are arguably unreasonable (Schultz).
4
 Ceva believes that interactive justice—unlike 
Rawlsian public justification—is owed to both the reasonable and the unreasonable 
(123). This means that, on her account, Smith, Beauchamp and Schultz should each 
have an equal substantive say, and each be equally disposed to listen to each other. Of 
course, if Schultz were to get “out of control,” there may be reasons for limiting his 
right to a hearing. But this, Ceva’s discussion suggests, would have to be 
acknowledged as a regrettable curtailment of interactive justice for the sake of 
outcome justice (19).  
So far, so good. The question I want to raise, and which strikes me as 
neglected in Ceva’s discussion, is: Who should have been invited to the teaching 
“negotiating table” in the first place? In her discussion, Ceva tends to assume a given 
value conflict, and takes the parties involved as exogenously given. She considers the 
question of who should count as a party only in passing, suggesting that being the 
holder “of a value claim concerning what ends collective action should pursue” is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for qualifying as a participant in a conflict 
(117). The final determination of who should be heard, she suggests, is to be 
outsourced to the relevant institutions (typically state institutions).  
This brief treatment of the issue is not fully satisfactory, especially since the 
aim of a theory of interactive justice is to provide guidance to the institutions in 
charge of granting rights to be heard. In particular, these rights may well have to be 
granted to individuals who are currently making no value claims and are oblivious to 
the existence of a conflict in the first place.  
To illustrate, the scenario I have offered is framed so as to immediately draw 
the reader’s attention to members of team A, but it is far from clear that they are the 
only ones who should be heard when it comes to the issue of how to construct the 
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 I am here relying on an intuitive sense of “reasonableness,” which, I acknowledge, is not fully parallel 
to Ceva’s more Rawls-inspired understanding. 
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relevant syllabus. Members of team B, it seems to me, should take part in that 
discussion too, even though, de facto, they are not “involved” in the conflict: Smith’s, 
Beauchamp’s and Schultz’s argument is happening unbeknownst to them. 
Furthermore, they should be part of the discussion because how they themselves set 
up part B of the course partly depends on what Team A decides. This is a matter that 
concerns them too: they are part of the relevant “public.” 
Some will have noticed that the question I am asking raises concerns that are 
structurally identical to those characterizing the so-called “boundary problem” in 
democratic theory (see, e.g., Whelan 1983; Arrhenius 2005; List and Koenig-
Archibugi 2010). For any given decision, the democratic theorist must ask who 
should be entitled to a say in it. That is, she must determine the “boundaries” of the 
demos. In the case of interactive justice, the “boundary problem” can be reformulated 
as follows: 
 
The interactive-justice boundary problem: For a given intractable value 
conflict, whose voices should be given a hearing? 
 
It may be argued that the parallel I am drawing between democratic decision-making 
and conflict management doesn’t quite work, because conflict management is not 
about “reaching a decision” (53-4). Yet it is not clear why this difference in aim 
should invalidate the suggestion that, in both cases, the question of “whose voice 
should be heard” must be answered. The burden of proof falls on the objector. 
Alternatively, it may be suggested that, with conflict-management, what we 
are interested in is simply making sure that those actually involved in a conflict be 
treated with the respect they are owed. In particular, only those who actively make a 
claim to being heard should count as “parties” to the conflict. 
This response, I think, is not one Ceva would (or should) endorse. This is 
because there appears to be a distinct interactive injustice—in her sense—in being 
excluded from a decision-making process that affects one’s interests. Once again, how 
part A of the course is organized is a matter of public concern, where the public 
includes not only members of Team A but also members of Team B. By not being 
notified about the meeting, and not being invited to the discussion, members of Team 
B are the victims of a (mild) interactive injustice. They are marginalized, if not 
altogether oppressed—the latter, in case the semester progresses, Team A’s plan 
(whatever this may be) is put into place, and at that point members of Team B must 
simply adapt to their colleague’s course-design. 
In sum, an important dimension of interactive justice involves identifying the 
parties to a conflict, by which I don’t mean the de facto parties but the de jure ones, 
namely those that ought to be “offered a seat at the negotiating table.” Although Ceva 
gives little attention to this important question, I shall try to offer a candidate answer. 
This is in line with much current literature on democracy, and can account for our 
intuitions about the Team teaching scenario: the “all affected interests” principle 
(Goodin 2007). As I shall suggest in the next section, if affectedness is what 
determines who is a party to a conflict in the relevant sense, then it is no longer 
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obvious that interactive justice requires each of those involved to be given an equal 





III. Equal or Proportional Say? 
To proceed with my argument, I need to say a little more about the theoretical 
background against which discussions concerning the all-affected-interests principle 
typically take place. To be sure, this principle is not without problems and challenges, 
but on a non-technical interpretation, it roughly involves giving a say in a decision to 
anyone who has a stake in it. Now, it is a core tenet of democracy that members of the 
demos should have an equal say in decision-making, and this in recognition of their 
fundamental equal status. Yet, as Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey (2010) have 
pointed out, a commitment to equal respect for persons—which ultimately underpins 
the democratic ideal—need not translate into an equal say. It is instead plausible to 
believe that how much of a say one should have in a given decision depends on how 
small or large one’s stake in the decision is. The larger the stakes, the greater the say, 
and vice versa.  
 This “proportionality principle” is highly intuitive (notwithstanding the fact 
that its operationalization is known to present considerable challenges). To see this, 
let me offer an example, which makes use of a famous scenario depicted by Brian 
Barry (1989). Imagine four people on a train carriage where there are no signs 
concerning the permissibility of smoking. Three of the passengers want to smoke, one 
does not. As it happens, however, the non-smoker suffers from asthma, and his health 
would be seriously endangered if the smoking policy was implemented. In these 
circumstances, it seems to me, the non-smoker’s stake in the decision is much greater 
than the three smokers’. For the latter, it is a matter of either enduring a longer wait 
for a cigarette, or immediately enjoying the pleasure of smoking. The asthmatic 
passenger, however, risks going to the hospital. In the circumstances, it seems clear 
that the non-smoker should be given a greater say in the decision, perhaps even a 
decisive one, given the magnitude of his stake compared to others’. 
 The same rationale could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the principle of a 
fair hearing in the context of intractable conflicts. Here, the idea is that how much of a 
hearing the relevant parties should be granted should be proportional to their stakes in 
the conflict. If we apply this principle to our two teaching teams, then it looks like, 
although Team B ought to be given a chance to express their views about Team A’s 
part of the course, their say shouldn’t be as great as Team A’s, since their stakes in 
part A of the course are arguably lower than Team A’s. For example, we may think 
that while parts A and B should be internally well-integrated, the integration between 
them can be somewhat looser.  
To give a more realistic example, it seems completely fair that, whenever a 
new appointment has to be made in a given academic department, every department 
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 In recent work, I have expressed some reservations about the all-affected-interests principle as “the” 
response to the democratic boundary problem. See Laura Valentini, “Who Should Decide? Beyond the 
Democratic Boundary Problem,” manuscript. 
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member be given a say or a hearing concerning the candidates. But if the department 
in question is, say, political science, and the candidate being scrutinized a political 
economist, then it seems procedurally fairer to still give the political economists a 
great say—e.g., more “air time”—during the deliberation phase. To be sure, there 
may be instrumental reasons for doing so—i.e., political economists have the greatest 
expertise in the area and are better placed to select the top candidate—but there also 
seem to be “intrinsic justice reasons” for adopting such a procedure. Political 
economists in the department are going to be the ones who will work most closely 
with the new hire, so they are the most affected: a lot more than everyone else. In 
recognition of this, justice requires that they be given a greater substantive hearing 
than their colleagues.   
 If this is right, then taking into account the boundary problem in relation to 
value conflicts leads us to question the tenability of the substantive conception of 
interactive justice Ceva puts forward. At least on an “affectedness approach” to 
identifying the demos, an equal substantive hearing only seems justified in cases 
where the stakes of those involved in the relevant conflicts are equal (cf. Christiano 
2006). Otherwise, the hearing should be unequal, and proportional to the stakes of the 
parties involved.  
 
Conclusion 
In this short discussion piece, I have highlighted a gap in Ceva’s account of 
interactive justice. To be sure, the solution I have suggested is itself susceptible to 
criticism. The all affected interests and proportionality principles have been variously 
disputed in the literature. My aim, however, has not been so much to defend a positive 
answer to the “boundary question” and propose an alternative account of interactive 
justice. Rather, my aim has been to highlight how the boundary question is integral to 
interactive justice, and how answers to that question may, in turn, have an impact on 
what we think interactive justice substantively requires. 
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